THE REFUGEE STATUS: CHALLENGE
AND RESPONSE
RICHAD ROBBINS*

I
No consideration of American immigration law today would be complete without
some reference to that familiar type of immigrant-the refugee. The case for the
refugee's inclusion requires no elaborate documentation. East and West, in Asia
no less than Europe, wars, revolutions, and conflicts among nation-states have produced innumerable forced migrations. We have an indelible impression of these
populations in flight, whatever the label selected to describe them-refugees, displaced persons, expellees, deportees, escapees. True, we Americans have been protected so far from actual population displacement, save those of us of Japanese
descent who were victims of a policy of forced relocation during World War II.
But we are conscious, nonetheless, of the refugee problem abroad, if only because
we are continually weighing our tradition of asylum for victims of persecution
against the realities of our basic immigration legislation now embodied in the
McCarran-Walter Act.1
Definitions of refugees abound, some emphasizing the broad legal, moral, or
sociological character of the problem, others the extent to which specific groups meet
the test of refugee status. For want of space, we may hold to the brief definition
utilized in Europe since World War II and recently incorporated, ambiguities intact,
into the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees: the refugee is one
who, "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country."' Although persons whose flight
is internal within a nation-state, members of ethnic groups returned to a "mother
country" after decades of separation, persons uprooted by famine and flood rather
than by political fiat all know the condition of displacement too, they are not included in the United Nations' general definition. Without such fringe types, the
* B.A. 1946, Brooklyn College; M.A. 1948, Washington State College. Instructor in sociology and
anthropology, Wellesley College. Studied various aspects of postwar refugee problems in western
Europe under Fulbright grant, 1949-50. Co-author [with Donald R. Tafti, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS
(x955). Contributor of articles on immigrant and other minority group problems to various periodicals.
166 STAT. 163, 8 U. S. C. §§ IXOI-503 (1952).
'For the full text, see JAMEs M. READ, MAGNA CARTA FOR REFUGEES 25 (U. N. Pub. Sales No.
1953.1.33). On definitions for the interwar period, see JoHN HOPE SimpsoN, THE REFUGEE PROBLEM 4
(1939). On the legal problem, see JACQUES VERNANT, THE REFUGEE IN THE POSTWAR WORLD 4-9 (1953).
In Vernant's view, the legal status of the refugee is established when he has left the state of which he is
a national as a result of political events and persecutions which transgress recognized moral principles.
But how can consensus be reached among nations as to what constitutes a breach of moral principles?
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world-wide refugee population today is said to number about fifteen million; with
the fringe types included, the figure jumps to about thirty million. These estimates
are, of course, highly unreliable owing to continuous changes in the state of international tensions.
Neither the debate over definitions nor the disagreement over round numbers,
however, constitutes the heart of the refugee matter. The crux of the problem lies
rather in the complex relationship between the status of refugee and the status of immigrant. The striking aspect of refugee movements is their transitional character.
Will refugees be offered the opportunity to achieve the more concrete status
of immigrants, and after that, the ultimate status of citizen? What are the refugees'
expectations of exchanging the unrewarding life of temporary camp communities
for a permanent place in a viable community overseas? How are refugees, destined,
faute de mieux, to settle permanently in the country which grants them temporary
asylum, to find a solid niche in the social structure of that country? These are the
questions of moment.
Only comparatively recently has the distinction between immigrant and refugee
status become directly relevant to American immigration policy. Americans have
-usually been concerned not so much with separating the expelled from the voluntary
immigrant, as with emphasizing the adjustment made by all kinds of newcomers
to the American scene. If every schoolboy knew that many colonial settlers came
to this country in flight from religious persecution in Europe, he knew equally well
that the push-and-pull of economic conditions were also a factor. (What was often
concealed from him was the ironic fact that the refugees from religious intolerance
in the Old World frequently failed to practice tolerance of diversity in the Newl)
During the nineteenth century, the German refugee intellectuals from the revolution
of 1848 mingled with the mainstream of German immigration; the Jewish victims
of pogroms and the Jewish victims of poverty struggled together to build a new
life on New York's lower East Side. After World War I, however, two fundamental
changes occurred: in the United States, quota immigration-refugee or otherwisewas sharply reduced; but in Europe itself, refugee groups available for emigration
were sharply increased as the new dictators began systematically to practice mass
expulsion of "undesirables." The refugee question had then to be rephrased for
Americans: how maintain over-all immigration restrictionism and, at the same time,
make. a place for some of the new refugees as a mark of our faith in the tradition
.of asylum to the oppressed? It is not in the least surprising that the "restrictionist
thirties" witnessed the admission of some 2ooooo refugees from German-controlled
areas, a little over half of them Jewish-this at a time when public opinion polls
showed two-thirds of the population opposed to an additional refugee influx, even
within the quota limits The welfare organizations sponsoring the admissions did
not feel they were in conflict with general immigration policy; they spoke rather of

-

8See The Fortune Quarterly Survey: XIII, Fortune, July 1938, p. 36, at 8o; The Fortune Suroey: XX,
Fortune,,April 1939, p. 84 at 102.
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special emergencies and the urgent need to organize a rescue operation for Jewish

and non-Jewish victims of Hiderism.
When the termination of World War II confronted the Western Allies with
another great mass of refugees and displaced persons, the American Congress took
up anew the immigrant-refugee equation. There were those who argued that a
restrictive policy had to be strictly maintained, refugees or no refugees. There were

those in the middle who favored continuation of the national-origins quota system,
but with allowance made for "emergency" refugee visas. And there was that small
minority which urged a sweeping revision of the entire quota system, the end-result

of which would be the assignment of "functional" priorities, regardless of place of
origin, to dependents, workers with special skills, and refugees meriting asylum.4

Over the last decade, Congress has pursued, as one might have expected, a compromise course. While the quota system has been maintained intact, a series of
dispensations have been made for refugees. So long as sentiment supported participation by the United States in the international approach to the refugee problem,

congressional intent could be translated into reasonably effective legislation. Under
the Displaced Persons Act,5 about 400,0o displaced persons entered this country on
special quota visas, 6 though Congress maintained a restrictionist hold on the opera-

tion by developing a novel "mortgaging" system.' Today, however, the patchwork
solution is increasingly self-defeating; the effort to match regular immigrants, "sur-

plus peoples," and refugees with the various national quotas has met with only fair
success. The bumbling provisions of the Refugee Relief Act of r9538 are traceable
not simply to the guile of individuals, as charged by such critics as Edward Corsi,
but to congressional reluctance to face up to the immigrant-refugee relationship. 9 The
way to proceed would appear to be to develop an immigration policy flexible enough
to cope with the periodic refugee emergencies within the framework of a general
admissions system. The way not to proceed would appear to be to continue to pass

special refugee legislation either wholly at odds with the regular admission system
or haphazardly attached to it.
'See generally Hearings before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). The last proposal was advanced by the Commission in its report, Whom We
Shall Welcome r17-23 (953), and was incorporated in a bill introduced by Senator Lehman (D., N. Y.)
in 1955. S. 12o6, 8 4 th Cong., tstSess. (i955).
'62 STAT. IO9 (1948), as amended, 50 App. U. S. C. § 1951-63 (1952).
o See U. S. DIsPLAcEnD PERSONS Com.'N, THE DP STORY 77-83 (1952).
'62 STAT. 1010 (1948), as amended, 5o App. U. S. C. § 1952(c) (1952).

Up to one half of the

visas assigned to displaced persons from small countries-which had exhausted their regular quotas-were,
by virtue of this provision, charged against future quotas; future regular immigrants thus "paid for'
present refugee immigrants.
867 STAT. 400, as amended, 5o App. U. S. C. A. § 197, (Supp. 1955).
On the strange "affaire Corsi" and the administration's unwillingness to further its own refugee
legislation, see Edward Corsi, My Ninety Days in Washington, in THE REPORTER READER 34 (Max

Ascoli ed. 1956). It would appear that the Eisenhower administration obtained its weak refugee law
only by pledging to ignore altogether the larger and related question of a revised immigration policy.
The refugee law was aimed at placating the liberal welfare organizations, on the one hand, without
antagonizing powerful restrictionist sentiment in Congress, on the other. On these matters, see Rorty,
Our Broken Promises to the Refugees, 20 COMMENTARY 301 (955).
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II
Over and above American immigration policy, what are the images evoked by
these two status categories, immigrant and refugee? Conditions differ so markedly
according to region and type of ethnic group involved that any simple set of distinctions is bound to be unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, some rudimentary distinctions
may be drawn. Fundamentally, the refugee's status is that of "victim of persecution." He belongs to a group violently uprooted by war or state decree. He is
temporarily homeless, the word "temporary" importing several months or possibly
several years. His ultimate destination is uncertain. He is likely to show greater
psychological strain than is common among traditional economic migrants. And
as a kind of ethical compensation for the tenuous quality of his status, he has a
legitimate moral claim upon host state or international community for legal protection, social assistance, perhaps overseas resettlement.
Once arrived in a country of reception, however, the refugee is at the threshold
of status transition. He is, henceforward, the immigrant from abroad seeking
permanent residence. His distinguishing mark, like that of the immigrant, is national culture difference, though his status as a victim of persecution or his ethnic
ties with the host population may mitigate somewhat the most serious clashes of
culture. With the economic migrant, he takes his place in the domestic labor
force, hoping for parity with other foreigners in the quest for employment. It is
natural that as public awareness of the refugee's painful experience begins to fade,
his socioeconomic status should approach that of other foreigners. Legally, the
refugee now assumes the status of resident alien, unless he is fortunate enough to
gain immediate acceptance as citizen in the new homeland. In the United States,
the transition in legal status does not seem a matter of pressing importance; once arrived, the refugee is, in principle, the same kind of resident alien as the regular
immigrant. In the Old World, however, the sequence refugee-to resident alien-to
citizen is not always an orderly one. It is not uncommon for the refugee-alien to
face unexpected crises over his passport, to find himself without adequate legal
protection, to be suddenly detained as a candidate for expulsion (refoulement)."°
There is, then, a continuing and involved relationship between the status of
refugee and that of immigrant. The two categories seem most divergent at the
source of emigration and during the voyage between countries. Then the refugee's
situation is the more chaotic, his outlook the more bleak. This is especially so where
the refugee is also legally stateless-that is, when no government recognizes his legal
claim to citizenship. Not that the modern economic immigrant is altogether free
of problems; he, too, must suffer a sea-change in transferring from one culture to
another. But in his case, a degree of order and purpose prevails-he has left a
definite place behind, he looks ahead to a specific community, and if trouble ensues,
he can obtain the legal protection of his consul. In any event, however, by the
time the terminal point of the migration is reached and refugees and immigrants
"oSee SImpsoN, op. cit. stpra note 2, for many examples.
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have won admission to countries of reception, the status distinctions begin to disappear. As we have seen, the American emphasis is on the absorption of refugees
into the body of general immigrants, who assume status positions according to race,
color, religion, or national culture. Elsewhere, however, refugees may undergo continued persecution in the host countries while other types of immigrants escape
discriminatory treatment. Or they may remain marginal to the community, sharing
in the new culture but hoping for a change in political climate that would permit
their return to their countries of origin: thus, the Spanish refugees in Mexico,
readily absorbed into Mexican culture yet not of it. Conversely, that small band,
the elite refugee artists and scholars, may win acceptance abroad as symbols of
the need to preserve creative intelligence from the blight of dictatorship: thus,
Einstein's science and Casal's musical art, as against the Hiders and Francos of
Europe. Again, refugee groups may be found in a sort of social limbo, expelled by
one country, unwanted by the countries to which they flee: thus, the Arab refugees
in West Jordan. It is obvious that the determination of final status for refugees is
dependent upon a great many factors, and the list of examples presented does not
begin to exhaust the number of possibilities for status transition.
In an era of great social instability, chance and fortuitous circumstances must
be considered important elements in determining the refugee-immigrant relation.
A concrete example serves better than a general discussion: The German-Jewish
refugees who came to the United States on the eve of World War II were able, in
the main, to bypass many obstacles encountered by regular immigrants. A middleclass background, a comparatively wide range of occupational skills, educational advantages, a determination to cut ties permanently with Germany, and a strong
measure of support from American Jews and non-Jewish liberals-all aided the
group to make a sound, diversified adjustment to American life. 1 If there was
some dissatisfaction among the refugees over downgrading in socioeconomic status
and some tendency among Americans in contact with the refugees to stereotype
from unfavorable individual experience (giving rise to the image of "ungrateful"
or "arrogant" refugee), the German-Jewish group moved steadily, nonetheless, from
refugee status, to resident alien status, to citizenship. By way of contrast, GermanJewish refugees caught in France on the eve of World War II and unable to remigrate discovered that in the country of asylum par excellence, xenophobia had
reached a point where one's status as refugee only complicated an uncertain position
as German and Jew. The downward path led from the anti-Semitic, police-state
practices of the Daladier regime to detention and deportation during the Occupation.12 Of course, this is only an illustration; it does not purport to stand as an
index to the traditions of asylum in France or the United States.
The parallels and contrasts drawn above, however, still do not provide a clear,
x' See MAURI
DAVIE, REFUGEES IN AmEwICA Cc. 9, io (1947).
12 See generally ABBE A. GLASSBERG, A LA RECHERCHE D'UNE PARIME; LA FRANCE DEVANT L'IMMIGA-

TION (946).
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succinct, and satisfying answer to the question: what is the special distinctiveness
of the refugee status? Reverting to our earlier description of an abstract refugee
status, three working generalizations, qualified, once again, as to time and place, are
suggested: First, it seems indisputable that social disorganization is both more
extensive and more intense among refugees than among immigrants. Second, the
very fact that the refugees' condition brings with it great social and psychological
strain makes it all the more probable that a response to their plight will be evoked
among peoples not directly affected by the refugee problem themselves, but conscious of its tragic dimensions. In considerable measure, that response can be termed
ethical or moral in character. And third, when the desire to come to the assistance
of refugees is translated into actual policy, it is likely most effectively to be realized
if guided by an international organization empowered to seek commitments from
member nation-states. These general aspects of the refugee problem warrant brief

appraisal before attention is turned to specific refugee groups in various regions of
the world.

No one has portrayed more incisively the scope of social disorganization amolig
European refugees than has Hannah Arendt in her recent work on the growth
of totalitarian systems. She holds that the price we pay for an increasingly rigid
nationalism is measured both by the greater number of persons expelled from one
state and by the reluctance of other states to grant the expellees refuge and safety.
As a result, "whoever was thrown out of one of these tightly organized closed
communities found himself thrown out of the family of nations altogether."' 13
In other words, disorganization means loss of identification with one's social community, not merely disruption of one's life inside the community. This decription
of refugees and stateless persons, caught, as it were, in a no-man's land between

communities, suggests a Kafka-like social disorder. Of course, so sweeping and
forbidding an indictment needs qualification. There is evidence that the psychological impact of "displacement shock" is very variable among different refugee
families.14 Indeed, some refugee groups display a surprising resiliency, a strong
desire to recreate a primary group existence similar to that achieved before dis-

placement, and this persists even in the detention camps which epitomize Arendt's
thesis.' Yet, even with these reservations, the refugee problem in both Europe
and Asia still remains a telling example of how far we can be carried from the
fundamental principle that men stand in need of an organized social community
so that they may assert, paradoxically, their very uniqueness and individuality.
If this were all, then the refugee plight would be one of unrelieved gloom.
There would be widespread disorganization, in Arendt's terms, and no reorganiza"HANNAH

ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 291

(1951).

" There are many moving descriptions of "displacement shock" and severe social disorganization
among refugees, but few structured psychological studies. For some examples of the latter, see H. B. M.
MURPHY, FLIGHT AND RESETTLEmENT (1955).

"See,

e.g., LEo SCHwARz, THE REDEEMERS (953);

KATHERINE HULME, THE WILD PLACE (1953);
12 ANT ocH REv. 155 (1952).

Riesman, Some Observations on the Limits of Totalitarian Power,
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tion. But a countervailing force is present, waiting to be developed. To repeat
our second general proposition: the great social disorganization involved in mass
expulsion can-not must-stimulate a correspondingly greater measure of assistance
from peoples in the more distant, safe communities. Assistance springs, in considerable degree, from a sense of moral compassion, the expression of which is the counterpart of the refugee's status as victim of persecution. Here is a sort of international
ethic, whether secular or religious, a modern version of the ancient tradition of
asylum. It eventuates in sponsorship of emergency relief, in support for refugee
rehabilitation projects abroad, or, most significantly, in revisions of immigration
laws sufficient to permit some of the refugees to gain admission to one's own country. No amount of shallow sociological theory about the relativism of ethical codes
in the West, no contention that discussion of the moral element is but an unsupported "value judgment," can obscure the ethical aspects of the refugee problem.
This is not to say that the ethical obligation felt among populations not directly
touched by the refugee plight is a simple, dear-cut matter. On the contrary, the
moral factor is complex, diffuse, and often subordinated to other considerations.
The status of the refugee as victim of persecution is the stimulus for the work of
such organizations as the American Friends Service Committee or the Catholic
agency Caritas, to whom the problem is primarily ethical. But it must be remembered that the refugee can also present himself as an immigrant seeking admission to a country whose people are concerned more with their own employment
situation than with intricate ethical questions. Moreover, the moral factor is always
worked into an institutional setting, so that the refugee question is meshed with
the debate over political and economic policy. If the necessity to "help alleviate
suffering overseas" is "sold" to the domestic policy-making body on the basis of
"filling gaps in our labor supply" or "striking a blow at communism," its presence
may yet be acknowledged. In an abstract way, everyone is for asylum to refugees,
as everyone is against sin, but policy formation, even in the best of all possible
democratic societies, is a matter of shades of gray, and ethical impulses are as subject as any other to the conflicts and compromises of the political process. It should
be added that the moral factor is equally complicated on the refugee side. Many
refugees do not want to be viewed solely as victims of persecution, in need of
"international charity." They aspire, and rightly so, to the more meaningful
status of immigrant in a new country, where opportunities for work and family
security are mingled realistically with the usual obstacles to immigrant adjustment.
But even when the issue of persecution is paramount, refugees are not thereby
stripped of all their other values, attitudes, and social backgrounds. Some refugees,
for example, are too old to fit into the labor force effectively; and, as victims of
persecution, although they have the sympathy of governments overseas, they are not
wanted as immigrants. It happens, too, that refugee groups can be narrow and
chauvinistic in their outlook, however logical the assumption that as victims of
intolerance, they ought to strengthen their bonds with other abused minority groups.
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A moral issue is probably posed most forcefully along these lines when the
refugee group seeking assistance is presumed to be accountable, in some way, for the
mass expulsion of other groups in the past, whether by active deed or by acquiescence
in a government's policy. The obvious case is that of the German ethnic minorities
(Volksdeutsche) and Germans from territory taken over by Poland (Reichsdeutsche), who were driven into rump Germany by East European governments at
the close of World War II. They had an authentic refugee status; they endured
extreme social disorganization; they needed international assistance. But these were
enemy people, "associated" both with the Nazi program of internal subversion of
governments, and with the deportation and massacre of non-German peoples. Did
the United Nations countries, which had suffered years of Nazi exploitation, have
a moral obligation to support these refugee groups? Or was it simply a matter of
do unto others ... ? The answer to the question had to be of mixed character. As
enemy people, the German refugees did not come under the United Nations mandate; they were supported directly by the West German government and private
welfare agencies. But the Allied powers contributed massive sums to the restoration
of the West German economy and social structure, which greatly facilitated the task
of refugee absorption. And the American Government authorized the admission
of 54,000 Volksdeutsche under the terms of the Displaced Persons Act.'" On the
other hand, the postwar Czechoslovakian Government, having experienced subversion on the part of its German minority, expelled the entire Sudetan group, the
apolitical along with the active Nazis and traitors. If President Benes' resolution
of the moral dilemma was understandable, it was also certainly unwise; mass ex-7
pulsion in retaliation for mass expulsion only creates greater social disorganization.1
With all the grave difficulties in arriving at consensus as to what is ethically
right or wrong in establishing policy toward uprooted peoples, it still seems reasonable to assert that the refugee problem generally structures a set of moral choices.' 8
64 STAT. 226 (1950), 50 App. U. S. C. S 1961 (1952), amending 62 STAT. 1013 (1948).
" Retaliation in kind represents, as well, a breach of moral principles in the sense meant by Vernant.
Anti-Nazi countries are placed in the uneasy position of defending policies against which they had
earlier waged unceasing war. To some degree, the view that "the whole German population is responsible
for Hitler" echoes the Nazi racist view that "the whole non-German population is racially inferior." On
this problem, see DONALD R. TAFT AND RiCHARD ROBBINS, INTERNATIONAL MIORATIONS 246-47 (s955).
"There is an interesting parallel here between the international refugee problem and the American
21

Negro problem, defined as a "moral dilemma."

See GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE AsusRICAN DILEMfA 3-25

1I945). The American Creed, Myrdal observes, with its emphasis on equality of opportunity, stands
in opposition to discrimination against Negroes, South and North. Similarly, there is tension between
an "international creed," based on asylum for the displaced, and the reality of restrictive immigration
policies and hostility to refugees. However, the analogy should not be pursued too far. In the first
place, "moral dilemma" is not an adequate explanatory framework. As has been noted, anxiety about
ethical contradictions need not result at all in group activity, in policy formation. Myrdal's premise, employed in oversimplified fashion by others, leads to an evasion of the prime fact that the uses and abuses
of power give direction to ethical impulses. Diffuse ethical creeds gain social force in being submitted
to the exercise of power by legislatures, business groups, unions, courts, and bureaucracies. More to the
point here is the difference between population displacement across national boundaries and a jace
problem within a state. The context for "moral dilemma" differs accordingly. The improvement
in the Negro's lot takes place inside a viable social community; no one takes seriously proposals for a
mass Negro exodus to Africa, or even a total population transfer from South to North. But the
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We feel a certain responsibility toward the victims of political persecution or wartime
displacement; this is an important element, if not the only one, in the programs developed to assist refugees and displaced persons.
What form should the assistance take? Where is the balance to be struck between national interest and international obligation? Our third generalization is
germane here. Countries of potential reception have been turning from unilateral
policy and from bilateral agreements to multilateral arrangements governed by an
international organization. And many refugees themselves, having lost their rights
in one community without gaining protection and asylum from another, have also
become more dependent on international organization, on the "Geneva community."
Host countries look to the international organization because it can manage a complex many-sided operation effectively; refugees look to the international community
because there may be no other.
The international organizations formed to cope with the refugee problem have
open to them a limited range of policies. Where feasible, they encourage repatriation, a necessary course of action at the close of a war when thousands desire nothing
more than a swift return to home, but at other times, acceptable to the western
democracies only on a voluntary basis. For those who fear to, or are unwilling to
return, the international organization sponsors a relief program-food, shelter, clothing, medical service. Essential as relief is during an emergency period, there is no
doubt that if it is prolonged beyond several months and is unaccompanied by programs aimed at employing refugees in jobs outside the camps, the result is serious
debilitation in the camp population in both a material and psychological sense. (The
recent controversy over the Baghdad Pact was but a pretext for the Arab refugees
in Jordan to engage in aimless rioting and destruction.) A more positive approach
is summed up in the word reintegration-or,more simply, integration. The international organization aids the refugee in making a permanent adjustment in the
country of first and temporary asylum. In plainer language, this means that both
host country and international agency recognize that a given refugee group cannot
go back, nor can it go forward. The realistic policy is, therefore, to make plans for
legal protection, self-sustaining employment, and welfare assistance in the country of
first residence, thus moving the refugee group off the dole. But often the alternative
of settling permanently in the country of first residence is not open to the refugee
group for various reasons. Then, the international agency may assume responsibility
for resettlement, an organized emigration of refugees from the unstable territory of
first asylum to more stable nation-states, frequently overseas. When resettlement sucrefugee's uneasy position between communities means that he is cut off from those groups in the community which command the power to make his protest heard. For the refugee, there is no NAACP;
hence, his dependence on an international organization for legal protection and assistance. Such is the
European pattern. In the United States, however, when the refugee has become the immigrant, the
"New American," he is generally able to make a steady progression in status, so that over two or three
generations, he will have moved far toward full participation in the community. Ironically, the Negro,
one of the earliest among the "Old Americans," is held back from a similar transition by skin-color
status.
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ceeds, the opportunity is made available for refugees to make the familiar transidon to immigrant, resident alien, and citizenship status in a more promising social
setting.
In the period between the wars in Europe, international assistance was usually
limited to relief and reintegration, if not to simple legal protection alone. Resettlement never came under consideration. Even in their limited aspirations, the refugee
organizations were largely ineffective. The rising tide of refugees, the low prestige
of the League of Nations, to which most of the refugee organizations were attached,
and the intransigence of the new totalitarian regimes engaged in mass expulsion
resulted in the enfeeblement of the international approach. If they were less than
overwhelmingly successful, however, the interwar agencies performed a valuable
service in setting the precedent for the more ambitious multilateral programs in
behalf of refugees developed after World War II.19 Thus, the International Refugee
Organization (IRO) was able to resettle more than a million refugees and displaced persons between 1948 and 1952, a feat described by the organization's last director-with a touch of prideful overstatement-as "the most successful and the most
efficient example of large-scale international cooperation in history."20 It is now
axiomatic that where large numbers of people have been displaced and are not
settled in ethnically homogeneous territories, any long-range program in their behalf
should be supported through an international organization, preferably within the
United Nations. And for the displaced person, especially if he is legally stateless, the
presence of an international agency implies assurance of a minimal legal and social
-

status.

In sum, the refugee problem is bound up in considerations of status transition,
social disorganization, moral decisions, and international cooperation. But the problem is, in fact, many problems-as will be seen.
III
A glance at Table I indicates that while the largest numbers of refugees are
found in Asia and the Middle East, the international response to their distressed
11 The important interwar agencies were: the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees
whose mandate covered mostly White Russians and Armenians; the Nansen International
Office for Refugees (1933-38), which developed the initial Refugee Convention providing refugees with
travel documents, legal protection, and minimal social assistance; the High Commission for Refugees
Coming from Germany (1933-38), totally ineffective in the face of Nazi power; the High Commission
of the League of Nations for Refugees (1938-47), an over-all agency which administered the conventions and sponsored very limited reintegration programs for about 5oo,ooo persons; and the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees (938-47), formed outside the faltering League structure on the
initiative of President Roosevelt, but rendered virtually ineffective by the outbreak of World War II.
For more detailed analysis and description, see generally SIMpSON, Op. cit. supra note 2.
"0j. Donald Kingsley, speech in Geneva marking the embarkation for resettlement of the millionth
IRO refugee, October 595i. IRO's constitution came into force in 1948. It had a membership of
eighteen nation-states and spent over $400,000,000 in behalf of refugees in four years, with the United
States contributing more than half of the costs. In addition to the 400,000 resettled in the United
States, there were about 125,000 sent to Canada, about 130,000 to Israel, nearly 200,000 to Australia,
about 9o,ooo to England, and smaller groups to Latin America, Scandinavia, and scattered points in
Africa. The complete account is contained in RENE RITELHUEBER, Au SECOURS DES REFUGiEs; L'OEUVRE
(192-33),

DE L'OIR (951).
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condition has been limited in scope. In particular, overseas resettlement has been
applied on a considerable scale to the European refugee problem, not at all to the
Asian and Middle Eastern situation. The reasons for this apparent contradiction
of our general thesis are not hard to discover. These latter countries, with the
exception of Israel, are characterized by large populations, comparatively low living
standards, village-peasant economies, and a lack of higher occupational skills. Increasing birthrates, while the death rate continues to fall, promise accelerated
demographic growth-at least until that distant time when industrialization may
provide various restraints. Governments, hard-pressed to find resources to sustain
the general population, are ill-equipped to deal with a large-scale refugee influx,
beyond providing minimal relief. In some countries, official corruption and spoliation
of the treasury by a feudal ruling class further inhibit assistance from flowing to the
refugees. The paucity of high labor skills among the refugees would prevent
overseas emigration to the West, even if rigid racial restrictions were not imposed.
One result of all this is that status distinctions between peasants and peasant-refugees
are soon blurred. Another is that a large measure of whatever special support goes
to refugees is dependent upon action by the West. But the very size and complexity of the refugee problemin Asia and the Middle East-as compared to Europe,
where United Nations agencies speak of "final solutions"--place limits on what the
western powers are able and willing to contribute. In short, both the countries
concerned and the Euroamerican community in a position to assist them are constrained to confine their activities to encouragement of voluntary repatriation, or to
limited programs of relief and reintegration. Even if the irrational color bar against
these "darker races" were not at issue, overseas resettlement of a few thousand
refugees would have little utility, since populations would continue to grow very
rapidly.
The West is recognizing the need, however, for token emigration of both regular
and refugee groups from Asia and the Near East. Australia's "white only" policy
is now relaxed to the extent of admitting several hundred Asian students on
temporary visas, and their reception has been favorable.'
The United States virtually ended the Oriental's racial exclusion and ineligibility for citizenship in 1952,
granting minimal quotas to countries whose members were formerly completely
excluded.2 2 Our recent Refugee Relief Act of 1953, too, makes a place for a few
Korean, Chinese, and Arab refugees.23 There is no reason why token immigration
of this sort could not be increased over the present microscopic level. Indeed, it
should be. But the effect would remain chiefly symbolic.
When we turn to actual refugee groups, these considerations are given greater
force. For example, there are about 6ooooo "white Chinese" refugees at the present
time in British Hong Kong. Unwilling to return to Red China, they are crowded
2

'See N. Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1955, p- 3, col. x.
(1952).

266 STAT. 175, 8 U. S. C. § 115

"'67 STAT. 401, as amended, 50 App. U. S. C. A. § 197 I(b)(Ix), (I2), (13),

(I4) (Supp. x955).
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into an area of only 365 square miles. They range in status from wealthy businessmen who have built new enterprises in the colony to the most destitute ("squatters") in the transient shoreline slums. In between are thousands of petty traders
eking out a living in a city whose function as a commercial link between China and
the West is hampered by ideological conflict. While Hong Kong is ninety per cent
Chinese, there is little social cohesion between permanent residents and refugees.
Nor is there an international organization to remedy the lack of support from
Chinese; in 1954, on the basis of a study by a distinguished student of international
law, the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees decided that the Hong
Kong refugees did not come under its mandate.4 (The problem stemmed from
the complex legal relationship between Red China, Nationalist China, Britain, the
United States, and the United Nations.) Pending an expansion of the High Commissioner's mandate, the outlook for this group of refugees is for gradual integration
into the colony's Chinese population, with small-scale relief forthcoming from the
British Government. Resettlement is not at issue, since the refugees have no
desire to migrate to Formosa and since Southeast Asian countries, struggling to
devise a formula for dealing with the "dual nationality" of their Chinese minorities,
have placed strict limits on additional Chinese immigration 5
In Indochina, the Geneva truce (1954) sanctioned the division of the former
French colony into North Vietnam, controlled by the Vietminh Communists, and
South Vietnam, supported by the free world. Since partition, about 6oo-8ooooo
refugees, the majority Roman Catholic, have fled to the South.26 Other groups within
the southern sector were displaced by the long, bloody war. The refugees are
living under very distressed conditions, with assistance confined largely to American
relief, public and private. The refugees do not receive minimal legal protection from
the UN. Even the relief program is seriously curtailed because of corrupt practices
by public officials in the Diem government. In 1956, the Diem government finally
completed plans for integrating about ioo,ooo refugees by settling them on abandoned
ricelands in the Southwest. Most of the expenses will be borne by the American
Government. The project's success depends upon factors far removed from the
refugee situation: decisions on countrywide elections, Communist penetration, the
ability of the Diem government to maintain order. The first efforts to move the
refugee problem from relief to reintegration could readily succumb to further disorder.
Korea is similarly truncated, a Communist-controlled government above the 3 8th
parallel, a government sustained by the free world below the line. The territorial
division, maintained after World War II and restored after the Korean War
2' Dr. Edvard Hambro's full report is still unpublished, but the preliminary findings were released in

March 1955. See, for the aims of the study, High Commissioner for Refugees, Report, U. N.

GENERAL

AsSEmtBL"Y OF. REc., ioth Sess., Supp. No. ii (Doc. No. A/29o2) (1955).
.' See Mallory, Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia, 34 FOREIGN AFF. 258 (1956).
-s See Exodus: A Report on a Voluntary Mass Flight to Freedom, Vietnam, 1954, 32 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 222 (1955).
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armistice, is certain to persist for some time. It might be translated from geographical into ideological terms, as a contrast between totalitarianism and democracy,
were it not for the embarrassing fact that Syngman Rhee's South Korean regime
verges on the dictatorial itself. Nevertheless, the existence of thousands of refugees
from the North indicates that it would be sophistry to so equate the two Koreas.
Moreover, the onus for armed aggression rests squarely with the North Korean and
Chinese Communists.
Nothing more clearly illustrates our generalizations on social disorganization,
moral dilemma, and international cooperation than does the Korean refugee situation. Thirty-seven months of war devastated South Korea; casualties were nearly
half a million, cities were leveled, economic capacity was destroyed. So widespread
was the destruction and disorganization that refugees from the North and residents
engulfed by the war in the South could not be clearly distinguished. The United
Nations member-states, with the exception of the Soviet Union and its satellites, responded to Communist aggression in defiance of the United Nations Charter by
mounting a military counter-offensive, the United States bearing the brunt of the
military burden. Without arguing whether "justified wars" can be nicely distinguished from "unjustified wars," it can be asserted that in this case, when the
problem had passed to the level of outright force, the United Nations did acknowledge a moral obligation to deal with aggression. And, by the same token, as
international cooperation had been employed to protect Korea, so it had to become
the prerequisite for rebuilding Korea. The United Nations Korean Reconstruction
Agency (UNKRA) commenced to fulfill this function when hostilities ceased in
1953. It had no special mandate for refugees; the basic task lay in rehabilitating
the Korean socioeconomic structure, to the benefit of refugee and nonrefugee.
(Refugee orphans did have a special status, and some became eligible for overseas
resetdement, but they were a relatively small group.) UNKRA's results, to date,
have fallen short of its generous goal, principally because member-governments
have not met their financial commitments, but also because of the sheer magnitude
of the task, local corruption, and complications inherent in a country economically
divided in two. Against these obstacles, however, UNKRA has made a notable
contribution to the idea of internationally planned reconstruction in industry, health,
education, and social welfare 7 Relief is slowly giving way to reintegration. Neither
repatriation nor overseas resettlement are viable alternatives.
India and Pakistan also owe their refugee problems to partition. With freedom
from Britain achieved, neither the Hindu majority nor the Moslem minority could
unite under the flag of a single, pluralistic state. The social disorganization attendant
upon independence was followed by intense religious communal strife and then by
an unplanned, chaotic cross-migration. About five or six million Moslems are reported to have fled to Pakistan from the India Union, while close to seven million
27 See Korean Reconstruction Agency, Report of the Agent General, U. N. GENERAL ASSEmBLY OFF.

Rac., 9th Sess., Supp. No. zo (Doc. No. A/275o)

(1954).
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Hindus and Sikhs entered India from Pakistan. The cost was high in deaths, rape,
arson, and property damage. The transfer did not produce a final solution; sizable
religious minorities remain in each country. In an era when social disorganization
is a common phenomenon, this migration stands as a special case. "The memory
of senseless and brutal bloodshed will possibly remain a permanent source of resentment between the two countries.: 2 s
Today, nearly a decade after these events, reintegration is proceeding in both
countries, but more successfully in India than in Pakistan. The two governments
were confronted with a refugee problem over and above the usual challenges common to heavily populated countries. All the more striking, then, is the vigor with
which the Indian Government has eliminated most of the relief camps, built model
towns, and made land grants and loans to its new citizens-by-migration. The
refugee situation has not been regarded as an international responsibility, nor, for
obvious reasons, has it been linked to overseas resettlement, but benefits have flowed
indirectly to refugees from the technical assistance programs of the United States
and the United Nations, programs designed to stimulate Indian development at
the village level. While it would be untrue to say that a "final solution" has been
reached, it is safe to predict that within the next decade, refugees will be sharing
with lifelong residents the new economic opportunities as well as the traditional
conditions of poverty and communal strife. The refugee problem will be absorbed
into the broader themes: population increase, urbanization, industrialization, land
reform, labor out-migration to Ceylon and other countries. In Pakistan, however,
reintegration programs for the refugees have not been as successful; social misery
is widespread, and short-run relief still necessary. Pakistan does not possess India's
economic resources, and it seems to be more resistant to socioeconomic change.
This is to say nothing of Pakistan's handicap in being composed of two distinct
territories, separated by hundreds of miles. Even so, the direction of change is
similar to that in India. 9
What forcefully strikes the observer in the Middle East is the great difference in
status between the Arab refugees and the refugee-immigrants in Israel. Israel's
Jewish refugees are moving toward absorption into a viable community, whatever
the accompanying strains.0 The Arab refugees have fled their Palestinian homeland without winning acceptance in neighboring host states where their "Arab
brothers" are found, and they are bitter and disillusionedP1
In 1948, Arab leadership brought the refugee problem upon itself. With the
state of Israel established under the aegis of the United Nations, Arab armies were
plunged recklessly into a thoughtless war whose consequences were resounding
Tim PoPuLATION OF INDIA AND PAXISTAN 121 (1951).
2' See Samuels, On the World's Conscience, N. Y. Times Magazine, Jan. i6, 1955, p. 13, col. I.
"0See generally, e.g., RAPHAEL PATAI, ISRAEL BETWEEN EAST AND WEST (1953); S. N. EISENSTADT,

2 KINGSLEY DAVIS,

Tim ABsonPnoN OF IM1,i1GRANTS (1954); NORMAN BENTWICH, ISRAEL (953); 57 Am. JnwisH Y. B.
(1956).
"1See, e.g., How the United Nations Helps the Palestinian Refugees, 2 U. N. REv. I1 (1955).
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defeat and a mass exodus of Palestinian Arabs. By 1956, however, the "moral case"
is so confused that neither the Jews, the Arabs, nor "Perfidious Albion" can be
charged with all the "blame" for the crisis and all the responsibility for breaking the
impasse. Officially, Arab spokesmen argue that the only course is repatriation of the
entire 9ooooo refugees---5ooooo from Jordan, 2oo,ooo from the Gaza Strip, and

ioo,ooo from Syria and Lebanon, respectively-a manifest impossibility. On the
other side, Israel appears to have withdrawn its earlier offer to repatriate up to
oo,ooo and to compensate those remaining from its own funds and with assistance
from the West. Vicious Israeli border raids, deserving the United Nations' censure,
are more than matched by Arab pillage of Jewish border settlements. The disheartening aspects of the new Jewish nationalism must be considered against the
background of Arab feudalism, with millions in oil revenues wasted by a privileged
elite32 And Soviet arms, sold to Egypt and other Arab countries, also reduce
prospects of compromise.
Meanwhile, of the Arab refugees who are on the rolls, about forty per cent are
actually in camps, with others billeted in crowded villages. Their status is the unenviable one of men on relief, dependent on international aid for food and shelter.
Their daily food ration is adequate, if meager; indeed, in this respect, their condition
is not far below that of the poverty-ridden nonrefugee fellahin. Even so, the lot of
the refugees is not a happy one. They are said to long for repatriation to the last
man, but no one really knows their attitudes. They receive the social security of the
ration card, but require something more-employment and integration into a community. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
(UNRWA) spends about $25,oooooo annually for refugee relief, but UNRWA's
$2oo,ooo,ooo available for integration projects is only beginning to be used, as Arab

33
resistance to the projects declines to some degree
UNRWA has long recognized the necessity of moving refugees "from ration lines
to self-supporting employment, and to make them economic assets of the near eastern
countries."3 4 Its aim has been to reduce relief to the extent that integration projects
succeed. Unfortunately, the numbers made self-supporting through 1955 have been
nearly equalled by those added to the camp registration rolls. Even completion of
two major reclamation projects-in the Sinai region and the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley
-would only result in the integration of about a quarter of the refugees3 5 The
recent more favorable view among the Arab states toward small-scale projects is a
hopeful sign,"8 however, although Arab commitments are not noted for reliability.
32 On Arab feudalism, see Malik, The Near East: The Search for Truth, 30 FoREIGN AvF. 231, 248
(952).

SSee How the United Nations Helps the Palestinian Refugees, 2 U. N. Rav. II (1955).
"See Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Annual Report of the
Director, U. N. GENERAL ASSE~miLY OFF. RMc., 9th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at I (Doe. No. A/2717) (x954).
"This estimate is based upon statements made by UNRWA officials. According to Henry R.
Labouisse, present UNRWA director, the two projects should ultimately provide employment and settlement for about 20o,ooo refugees.

"The writer cannot accept the view that small-scale projects will resolve the problem most efficiently,
but for a contrary view, see Peretz, The Arab Refugee Dilemma, 33 FOREIGN AFx. 147 (x954).
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But, as has been indicated, Moslem politics are not the sole obstacle; there are
moderates among the Arab states, as there are moderates in Israel. Other barriers
include the ambivalence among the refugees about repatriation, Israel's refusal to
consider token repatriation which might induce the majority to remain when confronted with definite choice, and the great engineering problems involved in developing the arid Arab borderlands. Finally, though the UNRWA projects do not
prejudice the ultimate issue of repatriation and compensation as defined by the
Assembly, many Arab leaders use this argument to oppose an expanded program.ar
That social cancer, the Arab refugee problem, can only be treated by further development of international integration programs, however numerous the roadblocks to success. Having recently turned from the sterile policy of constructing
paper empires of military alliances, the American Secretary of State has suggested
a sensible plan. Worked into a firm United Nations commitment, it would have
the following general provisions: First, it would be tacitly agreed that Israel's legal
existence could not be questioned, nor would she be expected to accept total repatriation of the refugees. Second, Israel would have to make adequate compensation for refugee property loss, costs to be partly underwritten by a long-term BritishAmerican loan. Israel would also have to offer repatriation to perhaps xooooo refugees, with priority granted to separated families, it being understood that the
refugees could expect a status no different from that enjoyed by other members of
the Arab minority in Israel. The Arab refugees remaining could anticipate participation in an expanded integration program to which the United Nations, the
Arab states, and Israel would contribute. International funds, now wasted on relief,
could thus be diverted to both integration and partial repatriation.?' (There is
speculation that, if confronted with meaningful choices in the place of empty
rhetoric, most of the refugees would choose integration, with less than ioo,ooo
opting for a return to a state which has been wholly transformed in their absence.) Arab "face" also might thus be saved on the repatriation issue. And
Israel would have gone very far toward meeting a moral responsibility-for whatever the original role played by Arab demagogues in inciting the refugees to flee
in 1948, the fact remains that the refugees did lose their land and property to the new
Jewish settlers. Of course, only the most sanguine would look forward to the swift
adoption of the course recommended here. But some way must be found to alter
the dependent, relief status of the Arab refugees.
The conditions for refugee status transition are being worked out in altogether
different fashion in Israel. Since 1948, over 700,000 immigrants have entered the
new state, the majority refugees from Nazi persecution in Europe and Arab harassment in the Middle East. In the critical years after World War II, the United
Nations and the world Jewish community cooperated in rescuing these groups and
transporting them to Isarel. Now refugee immigration has practically ceased, save
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, supra note 34 Passim.
Dulles, The Middle East, 33 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 378, 379 (1955).
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for the influx of a few thousand North African Jews.?' (There are about half a
million Jews in North Africa, most of whom are expected to remain, especially if
the new Moroccan and Tunisian governments implement pledges to replace the
traditional Jewish status of dhummi-legal protection but not citizenship-with a
grant of full equality with Moslems.)
Surely, there is contradiction in Zionism-a nationalist ideology developed to meet
the problems created by nationalism-to-excess! But the lengthy debate among the
Jewish intelligentsia over the wisdom of Zionism is no longer relevant. The question is academic; the resurgence of anti-Semitism in Europe, together with the indifference in the West toward the fate of the victims, converted the idea of "a homeland for Jewish national culture" into the necessity for a country of asylum. The
crucial fact is that Israel has given refuge to and absorbed so many thousands of
displaced and homeless Jews. And more positively, Zionism has made it possible
to create in the Middle East a modern, democratic society, devoted to human freedom and, with ail its faults and occasional xenophobic excesses, committed to fostering a stable Middle East. The world Jewish community outside Israel is free to
reject both the naive solution proffered by Arthur Koestler and David Ben Gurion
(either assimiliate completely or move to Israel), 4° and the equally absurd alternative propounded by anti-Zionist American Jews (regard Israel as just one more
foreign nation-state) . Instead, American Jews and Jews elsewhere can continue to
support Israel chiefly on the grounds that it is resettling refugees for whom there is
no other place. This holds equally well for non-Jews who recognize an international
responsibility to contribute to a solution of the refugee problem.
Since 1948, the status transition from refugee, to immigrant, to citizen, has been
accelerated in Israel. The process is complicated by the fact that the proportion of
newcomers to older residents is very high; by the fact that there are many so-called
Oriental Jews from the backward Arab villages and towns who are being pressed
to read, to write, to run machinery, to vote; by the fact that there is strain between
the European and Oriental groups comparable to the tension between "old" and
"new" immigrants in the United States;42 by conflict between labor socialists and
orthodox rabbinical groups; by controversy over how best to cushion an adverse
balance of trade. But throughout the state, the various refugee groups-from
Germany, Poland, Russia, Iraq, Yemen, even India and China-are being absorbed
into a dynamic social system which joins an industrial-urban complex to a traditional agricultural base. The exiles in the Diaspora are being gathered in.

IV
In x945, the victorious Allies in western Europe established the goal of "permanent solution" of the refugee and displaced persons problem brought about by
"See TAFT AND ROBINS, op. cit. supra note 17, at 29o-91.
" See ARTHuR KOESTLER, TRAIL OF THE DINOSAUR (1955); Teller, America's Two Zionist Traditions,
20 COMMENTARY 343 (1955).
," See, e.g., ALFRED LIIENSmAL, W Ar PRICE ISRAEL? (1953).
,' See AAHAti SnuNsKy, THE CLASH OF CULTURES IN ISRAEL (1955).
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World War
If the end was never quite realized, the task accomplished was,
nonetheless striking. The IRO resettlement program has already been described.
What stands out in this experiment, over and above the waste motion and inefficiency, is the lesson that a planned, multilaterally organized approach to the refugee
question is as feasible as it is desirable.
By the end of 1953, however, the economic and social climate of western Europe
had undergone several marked changes. Countries paralyzed by the destruction of
World War H had gone far along the road to economic recovery. They had also
managed to avoid further large-scale warfare on the European continent, warfare
which would have meant, among other things, additional thousands of refugees.
The World War II refugees had been greatly reduced in number through resettlement and reintegration, although more than 7oooo remained in camps, and several
thousand additional "difficult cases" required institutional care. (These people were
located not only in western Europe, but in Greece, Turkey, parts of the Middle
East, and China.) Overseas countries of potential reception, somewhat fatigued
by the refugee issue, felt free again to consider the "refugee emergency" within the
framework of broad immigration policy. They commenced to re-examine their
immigration policies in the light of the availability of "surplus peoples," persons
whose status did not necessarily include a background as victims of persecution,
but who might contribute to economic development overseas, and in a limited
fashion, might reduce economic pressures at home. In short, in western Europe,
the relation between immigrant and refugee statuses commenced to be redrawn.
This difference between 1945 and 1956, between European stabilization and Asian

turmoil, between "refugee emergency" and the "surplus population problem," is
borne out by a brief appraisal of actual refugee situations.
. The refugees from World War II and before who remain in Europe come under
the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
Dr. G. J. Van Heuven Goedhart, who hopes to arrive at a "permanent solution" by
1958. (Dr. Goedhart recognizes, however, that international disorganization is
characteristic of the times, making hazardous any predictions of final settlement.)
The mandate covers about 350,000 persons, of whom about 70,0oo are still in camp

communities or living under distressed conditions. UNHCR is concerned primarily
with facilitating integration and assuring legal protection; it sponsors no resettlement except for assisting a few refugees to emigrate under the supervision of the
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM)
"For probably
.

" See

DIRECTOR GENERAL 0:

THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION,

MIGRATION FROMS EUROPE 12

(95').
"This Committee was formed in 951, on American initiative. It has twenty-four member-goxernments, but is organized outside the United Nations to avoid affiliation with the ILO, whose membership

includes Soviet satellites.

It has financed, since 1952, an annual overseas emigration of about x20,ooo

from Germany, Austria, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands. The migrants have gone principally to the
United States, Canada, Australia, and Latin America. While several thousands of these persons have
been refugees, ICEM has focused primarily on the problem of limited emigration of "surplus peoples."
Projected emigration for 1956 is about 125,000 Europeans. See Warren, International Eflorts to Solve
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ninety per cent of the refugees now under the wing of High Commissioner's Office,

assimilation among the populations of countries where they are living must be
the ultimate answer to their problem."4 Nevertheless, UNHCR's work has been
valuable, and the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to it in 1955 was certainly deserved.
For clearing the camps, extending legal protection, and establishing final solutions
for "difficult cases," the High Commissioner requires about $i6,oooooo. Those not
in need of immediate attention will move toward integration largely on their own,
in various European countries. Special efforts will be made to aid several thousand
Greek refugees.
The only other non-German European refugees are the East European escapees,
roughly 2ooooo persons who have fled Soviet-dominated areas to seek asylum in

West Germany or Austria. They are mostly from Czechoslovakia and the Balkan
states, but those from the Soviet Union itself receive more public attention since

they represent tangible evidence of the superiority of western freedom measured
against the Soviet system. Unfortunately, the West has encouraged flight from
Iron Curtain countries without giving enough thought to the eventual status of those

who take the risk. This has led to some disillusionment on the part of the refugees,
who may now be more willing to respond to the Soviet Union's appeal to repatriate under amnesty. The United States Government as well as American private
groups support the escapee program. The escapees are eligible for emigration overseas sponsored by the ICEM, and a small number have arrived in the United States
under the terms of the Refugee Relief Act. Integration in West Germany is proceeding very slowly. The West has half-neglected this refugee group. Yet, as a
New York Times editorial remarks, "The challenge and our responsibility to meet
it would seem plain."46
West Germany's refugee problem, which loomed so large in the early postwar
years, is now being resolved through integration. Altogether, about ten million
persons are included in the total: ethnic Germans, Germans expelled from former
territory of the Reich east of the Oder-Niesse line, Germans who have fled the Sovietcontrolled East German territory. The massive exodus into rump Germany not
only resulted in severe social disorganization, but raised serious ethical questions discussed earlier. The point to stress here, however, is the progress made in refugee
integration as a corollary of marked economic recovery. Ethnically similar to the
host peoples, the expellees were granted equal legal status soon after their arrival.
Camp populations were drastically reduced, refugee unemployment rates were cut
(though not to the level of the domestic labor force), and a more even refugee regional distribution achieved. Overseas resettlement never figured seriously in the
plans for absorption; West Germany was short of labor herself, and, in addition,
Refugee Problems, 30 DEP'T STATE BULL. 26 (1954), for a description of the organization of ICEM and
a summary of its progress over a two-year period.
" D

oF PUBLIC INFORMATION,
aP'T

PROMOTING PERMANENT

TIONSAL
COMMUNITY PROGRAM 5 (U. N. Pub. Sales No.
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overseas political hostility toward Germans remained a potent force for several
years. Today, it is estimated that over three-fourths of the refugees are integrated.
(The rough percentage, an unreliable index admittedly, is measured in terms of
employment, housing, social security.) Although integration is being accomplished
without support from international organizations, it would be wrong to suppose
that West Germany received no assistance from abroad. Direct American aid
to refugees was channeled through the ECA/MSA program, while refugees shared
indirectly in the billion dollars appropriated by Congress through 1952 for West
Germany and Berlin37
Other things being equal, expellee integration and social assimilation should be
realized by the end of this decade. Reunification of Germany-a doubtful prospect
at present-would, of course, have an impact on the refugee problem. Conceivably,
the Soviet Union might then permit a partial repatriation of Germans to the eastern
territories if new accords could be written with the Polish Government.
In brief compass, this is the picture of the refugee situation at the present time
in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In Europe, the United Nations and individual nation-states have succeeded in resettling or integrating large numbers of
refugees, leaving a smaller group whose uncertain status still commands moral
sympathy and may yet call out an international response sufficient to assure "final
settlement." As a result, European members of the Free World are now turning'
their attention to economic development, including the possibility of sponsoring
limited emigration, nonrefugee and refugee, in order to cope with labor surpluses.
On the other hand, for refugee groups in the Middle East and Asia, reintegration is
far from achieved, while resettlement overseas is largely an academic question. The
West recognizes that it shares with governments directly concerned some responsibility for this state of affairs. But ethical concern is tempered with realism. Even
a marked increase in western aid to underdeveloped regions could not dissolve problems of economic distress, overpopulation, and nationalistic conflict which underlie
the refugee issue. What aid and trade may do, however, is to hasten currents of
economic and social change. Along this general route lies the opportunity to improve the special status of thousands of Asian and near eastern refugees.
V
We return, at last, to the question of American immigration policy and its relation to the refugee problem. As indicated previously, the United States has played
an important part in the program to assist populations displaced by war or political
action. Our contribution to status transition is represented by the more than
400,000 refugees and displaced persons resettled here since the end of World War
II. There is every reason to believe that this group will successfully assimilate within

the framework of a pluralistic culture. And the difficulties faced by the present
rFor a summary review, see Schechtman, Postwar Population Transfers in Europe: A Study, 15
See also FRIEDEICH ERDING, THE REFUGEES AS A BURDEN, A SIn,REVIEW OF POLITICS 151 (1953).
tILUS, AND A CHALLENGE TO THE WEsT GERmAN EcoNo y (19pI).
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refugee-immigrants seem no more severe than those encountered by earlier vol48
untary immigrants or the refugees of the thirties.

With respect to international organization, this country supports the work of
the High Commissioner, contributes more than any other nation-state to UNRWA's
relief projects for Arab refugees, upholds the principles of legal protection contained
in the Refugee Convention, and, through its general foreign-aid programs, indirectly
assists countries whose problems are complicated by the presence of large refugee
groups. It can be argued, however, that we may better discharge our international
responsibilities in two additional ways. First, our moral commitment to sustain
principles of justice in the treatment of displaced populations would have greater
force if this government became a party to the Convention on Genocide as well as
the agreement to oppose various kinds of forced labor. (We also have a clear
obligation to sign and ratify the Convention on the Status of Refugees to which
fourteen states are parties.) For, it is clear that refugees are often the product of
decisions by dictatorial regimes to engage in mass extermination of minority peoples
or to deport workers by the thousands to distant territories to work as modern
slaves. In an effort to appease the proponents of the Bricker Amendment, the
Secretary of State appears to have been reluctant to enter into these commitments.
He has said that our own national law already guarantees individuals and groups
against such abuses. All the more reason, then, it would seem, to place our moral
position squarely on record; nothing is lost in the way of national sovereignty, something is gained in supporting international agreements. Second, the leading nationstates in the West, the United States included, could readily sustain an IRO on a
smaller scale than the IRO of the postwar period but committed to the same general
ends. It is apparent that the present High Commissioner's Office is too restricted in
scope and geographic mandate. A new IRO-indeed, a permanent IRO-would
constitute international recognition of the endless challenge posed by refugee problems. If properly organized to avoid overbureaucratization, if properly designed to
steer a firm path between international obligations and national interest, if animated
by the desire to include limited numbers of Asian and Middle Eastern as well as
European refugees in plans for resettlement-such an organization would materially
strengthen the constructive side of the United Nations' work.
In the United States itself, the primary task lies, as already noted, in bringing
greater flexibility to the immigrant-refugee relationship. This can be accomplished
largely by reappraising the national-origins quota system. Given the present coalition of interest groups in Congress, the proposal of the President's Commission on
Immigration and Naturalization to assign a bloc of quota visas to refugees without
regard to national origin is not likely to realized. (The proposal called for the
admission of these persons under a special category based on the right of asylum.)
A more realistic alternative is to adopt, as soon as possible, necessary revisions of
4 See generally U. S. DisPLAcED PERSONS Coaea'N, op.
9

dit. supra note 6.
op. cit. supra note 4, at 118-i9.
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our immigration law within the national-origins framework. Over-all quota immigration should be increased by iooooo visas to a total of about 254,000; this would
permit refugees-and nonrefugees-to emigrate in larger numbers from countries
with tiny quotas. The mortgage on future quotas, brought about by the displaced
persons program of 1948-52, represents a legislative quirk which should be eliminated. Provision should be made for pooling unused quotas which accumulate
yearly from western European countries. Assignment of these visas can be made
to immigrants with special preferences and to a limited number of refugees seeking
asylum, regardless of place of origin. Finally, coordination between immigration
and refugee policy is a complex matter; it should be the responsibility of an administrator skilled in treating immigration problems, not the responsibility of a
security officer in the State Department. Obviously, refugee admissions must be
cleared on security grounds, but this scarcely means that the obverse holds-that
security matters should determine refugee admission policy. The Refugee Relief
Act is a telling example of this confusion.
These are the minimum requirements of a revised refugee policy. 0 No one is
prepared to defend the right of asylum in absolute terms. The United States could
not open its doors to all those seeking a haven from oppression overseas, even if the
Congress were so minded. But there is an urgent necessity to alter the most restrictive aspects of a most restrictive law-the McCarran-Walter Act-so as to admit
additional refugee-immigrants, to offer asylum, in Washington's phrase, to "the
oppressed and persecuted of all Nations and Religion; whom we shall welcome to
a participation of all our rights and privileges, if by decency and propriety of conduct
they appear to merit the enjoyment." 51
"oThese recommendations are embodied in a statement which the writer submitted to the Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary studying revision of the immigration laws, in November 1955.
They were submitted in the form of a statement to the subcommittee and entered into the record. On
Feb. 8, 1956, President Eisenhower submitted a special message on immigration to Congress, recommending an increase in quotas of about 65,ooo, elimination of the displaced persons mortgage, and the
pooling of unused quotas without regard to national origin (but, unfortunately, also without regard
to a category of asylum among the preferences to be carried over from existing law). Immigration and
Nationality Laws, H. Doe. No. 329, 84 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
127 THE WRIMNS oF GEORGE WASHINGTOM 254 (Fitzpatrick ed. 1938'.

